

3-6 November 2014
Paris Marriott, Rive Gauche

www.sulphurconference.com


Hydrogen Safety In the Sulphuric Acid Industry

Sulphur | Sulphuric Acid

Hydrogen Safety Concerns In the Sulphuric Acid Industry

"What we didn't know we didn't know"

Simplified Manufacturing Diagram




First Hydrogen Event - Waste Heat Boiler Leak



First Event / Secondary Failure – Economizer Tube




Hydrogen Concentration Build-up



12/19/2014

First Failure – First Indication



First Failure – Radial Flow Converter Damage




First Failure – Converter Damage




First Failure – Converter Damage

















Hydrogen Concentration Build-up



12/19/2014











Sulphuric Operating Experience


750 Plant-Years of Sulphuric Acid Operating Experience with no hydrogen explosion incidents!

Aerial View of Plant





Project View of IPA Tower








Left Picture: shows damage to the candle level of the IPA Tower Right Picture: shows damage to the DT Exit Duct as the roof of the IPA Tower made contact with it





These two pictures show the IPA Exit Duct Support; where it used to be, where it wound up






This is two pictures of the same section of duct. One from above and one from below







Left Picture shows how the duct rotated 180 degrees from South to North Right Picture shows the roof of the IPA Tower where it landed




Left Picture shows where the contractor was actively welding the band on the duct Right picture shows the force of the blast blowing the flashing off the Cold Hex








Misc. debris in the blast radius



Understanding Industrial Accidents



Victim Impact Levels


1st-Party Victims – Directly involved in the Operations

2nd-Party Victims – Non-operating system users

3rd-Party Victims – Innocent bystanders

4th-Party Victims - Future Generations

First Failure – First Indication










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Failure of Imagination





 Old Old Procedure – pump neutralizing solution through coolers one cooler at a time.


 New Old Procedure – pump neutralizing solution through the (3) coolers in series.

 New New Procedure – pump neutralizing solution through coolers in parallel

- Plant & Contractor Followed Procedure
- Procedure had been "improved" to reduce time & cost
- Hot condensate was not available for neutralization
- Recirculation pump broke down with no spare on site


- Supply of hot condensate for neutralization solution make-up was out of service during the time of the cooler cleaning
- Had previously begun using Caustic Soda rather than Soda Ash for neutralization solution
- Recirculation pump coupling broke and no spare pump or coupling was on site. Lost 12-hours of neutralization time.
- Acid side cooler drains were inspected and approved by three levels of operations management

Shell and Tube Acid Cooler



Residual Sulfates Plugged off Baffle Drain Notches

Shell and Tube Acid Cooler



- Acid Side only has one drain in center drain check indicates cooler is empty
- Neutralizing solution is trapped behind baffles

AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety

Web-seminar titled "<u>Lessons learned from the Space Shuttle</u> <u>Challenger Disaster</u>"

An Organization's Culture must:

- 1. Maintain a sense of vulnerability about your process
- 2. Combat the acceptance/normalization of deviances
- 3. Establish an imperative for safety
- 4. Perform valid and timely hazard and risk assessments
- 5. Ensure open and frank communications
- 6. Learn and advance the culture