

# Hydrogen Safety For Sulfuric Acid Plants









#### SYMPTOMS OF ACID COOLER TUBE LEAK

#### DROP IN pH OF COOLING WATER FROM THE COOLER

- 0.05 wt% H2SO4 (~0.01N) has a pH of 2 (Δ~5,800 micro-mhos/cm²)
- 0.5 wt% (~0.1N) H2SO4 has a pH of 1 (Δ ~24,000 micro-mhos/cm²).

#### IF LEAK IS SUBSTANTIAL OUTLET WATER TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE

Making 5% ΔH2SO4 raises the CTW temperature by 15 °F







#### Hydrogen is also Present During Repairs

#### **Brief Description:**


Two employees were in the process of completing a weld repair on a shell-and-tube heat exchanger.

Tack welds were completed on the plug. When the employee initiated final welding on the plug, a flash fire occurred.

Due to close proximity to the work, both employees received minor burns from the flash.

#### **Initial Findings:**

- General work, confined space and line break permits were created and followed for the task
- Flammable vapor tests were conducted immediately prior to welding start with no issues detected
- Employee was wearing Nomex



#### Opportunities to Leverage:

- Ensure continuous monitoring during hot work
- PPE prevented more serious injury to employee
- Fuel source is likely hydrogen gas







## Hydrogen Safety Committee Observations and Conclusions

#### Members:

Solvay

Mosaic

Outotec

Chemetics

**MFCS** 

Rick Davis – Consultant Lenny Friedman - Consultant







 $Fe+H2SO4 \rightarrow FeSO4+H2$ 

 $H2+1/2 O2 \Delta Q/> H2O$ 







## **General Observations**

- A majority of water leak events occur without incident
- H<sub>2</sub> incidents predominately occur when
  - Substantial amounts of acid are diluted
  - Large surface area equipment is involved
  - The blower is stopped







### Weak Acid Excursion Causes

- Equipment failure
  - Nearing end of life expectancy
  - Malfunction
  - Defect
- Upstream sources
  - Significant waste heat boiler or superheater leak
- Operating/maintenance procedures
  - Incomplete or incorrect decontamination or commissioning
  - Lack of procedures or drains to remove condensed acid
- Inadvertent water dilution
  - Leaking dilution water control valve
  - Concentration control analyzer failure







## **Contributing Factors**

- Recognition of the potential severity
  - Leaks rapidly escalate
  - Risk of collateral damage increases
  - Potential for damage outside of unit increases
    - acidification of cooling water circuit
- Response to a deteriorating situation
  - Sufficiency or ability to isolate/drain water
  - Ability to rapidly remove weak acid from the system
- Awareness of dangerous conditions
  - Corrosion of large surface area equipment results in high H<sub>2</sub> generation rates
  - Minimal oxygen is required (> 4 vol%)
  - · Stagnant high spots allow mixture to reach the explosive limit







## Conclusions

- When weak acid is present, H<sub>2</sub> will be generated
- H<sub>2</sub> was a wide explosive limit
- Ignition energy for H<sub>2</sub> is very low
  - (It will happen!)







## High Level Guidelines







## Hydrogen Safety Committee High Level Guidelines

- Minimize H2 formation by
  - Separating weak acid from metal
    - Guidelines will be plant specific
- Minimize water ingress
  - Isolate the cooling water
  - Beware of H<sub>2</sub> formation in cooling systems
  - Provide economizer BFW bypasses





## Hydrogen Safety Committee High Level Guidelines

- Address H<sub>2</sub> accumulation
  - Blower purge
  - High point vents
  - N<sub>2</sub> purge
- Operational awareness / formal procedures
  - Emergency plans
  - Training
- Infrastructure
  - Expand Hazop scope to shared utilities
    - Cooling water systems











## **Moving Forward**







## Efforts Should Be Focused On:

- Early detection of leaks
  - pH or conductivity in acid coolers
  - Acid accumulation in economizers
- Mitigation
  - Shutdown procedures
  - Equipment evacuation
- Prevention
  - Avoiding the H2 explosive limit







## What Can Be Done To Prevent H<sub>2</sub> Incidents?

#### **Technology suppliers**

- Incorporate findings in HAZOP
- Adjust designs accordingly







## What Can Be Done To Prevent H<sub>2</sub> Incidents?

#### Operating companies

- Be on the lookout for indicators
- Keep training current
- Have written emergency procedures
- Regularly test pH/conductivity meters
- Transfer experience (Legacy planning and site to site)
- Test your operator's skills (Drills)







## A Final Thought

- Communicate information like what is being presented here to your operators!!
- Plan ahead. Prepare emergency procedures so that hasty decisions don't have to be made in a time of crisis.
- Adjust procedures based on experience










Sharing experiences might make you feel like you are standing naked in the sunshine...

# But, feeling naked motivates one to become "Stronger"!!











## Thank you!



The miracles of science™

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Rick Davis – Consultant Lenny Friedman - Consultant

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